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VERTICAL FLIP
Allen Kamp
This article grew out of my ongoing attempt to understand conservative ideology. Thinking about the topic for the 2006 Gloucester
conference, I remembered William F. Buckley, Jr.'s Up from Liberalism' (1959) and simultaneously thought of a function on my Adobe
Photoshop, the "Flip." (The "Flip" produces a mirror image of your
photo, either vertically or horizontally.) It struck me that Buckley's
Up from Liberalism equated liberalism with slavery. In it, he describes the conservative as a slave to liberal hegemony: liberal society
is an "engine for the imposition of liberal orthodoxy." In an essay,"Why Don't We Complain," (1961, reprinted in Miles Gone By 2 ),
he describes the situation of the American citizen as one of
helplessness:
Our notorious political apathy is a related phenomenon. Every
year, whether the Republican or the Democratic Party is in office
more and more power drains away from the individual to feed vast
reservoirs in far-off places; and we have less and less say about
those decisions which shape our future. From this alienation of personal power comes the sense of resignation with which we accept
the political dispensations of a powerful government whose hold up
to us continues to increase. 3
But the first three chapters of his "literary autobiography," Miles
Gone By (2004), describing his life as an adolescent, hardly seem to be
about one oppressed and exploited. He describes sailing, races on his
own sailboat;4 horse shows, plunging into the pool after galloping
through the estate's woods; private music lessons; and being tutored at
home. This idyll was punctuated by one year at an English boarding
school.'
He typifies himself and those like him as oppressed by the liberal
regime, with their power draining away and his wealth being robbed
by the state is a "vertical flip." The privileged are transformed into
the oppressed.
Buckley's "vertical flip" is not unique; it is a rhetorical devise used
in several, often surprising contexts, ranging from affirmative action to
abortion. Equating an opponent's position with slavery demonizes
the position; it is rhetoric that has gone ballistic.
1. WILLIAM F.
2. WILLIAM F.
(2004).
3. Id. at 564.
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id. at 3-35.
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RHETORICAL INSTANCES

A.

Affirmative Action

The device is used most often in the context of affirmative action,
which is seen as not helping disadvantaged groups but as enslaving
them or, in the case of African Americans, re-enslaving them. We see
this in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,6 in which he states that affirmative action programs "not
only raise grave constitutional questions, they also undermine the
moral basis of the equal protection principle. Purchased at the price
of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation's understanding that such classifications ultimately
have a destructive impact on the individual and our society." 7
The earliest use of the device that I have found is Yick Wo v. Hopkins.8 The City and the County of San Francisco had required laundries to be built of brick and stone. Chinese owned laundries were the
only laundries not made of brick and stone, and thus the ordinance
had what we call today a disparate impact. The Court held that the
laws prevented the laundry owners from earning a living, which was
the usage of slavery.
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or
the means of living, or any material is essential to the enjoyment of
life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.9
Later, in Grutter, Justice Thomas begins his dissent from the Court's
validation of the affirmative action progress of the Michigan Law
School by quoting Frederick Douglass. 10 The practical import of the
program was to boost minorities in the entering class about 10%
higher than under a race blind scenario."1 With an entering class of
about 350,12 this yields an immensely small number of students. This
modest result is then equated with racism, which is demeaning to us
all, and violates the Equal Protection Clause. 13 Justice Scalia sees minority businesses' set asides as the source of racial discrimination
"which is the tendency-fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and
on the basis of their country of origin or the
judge men and women
'14
color of their skin."
6. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995).
7. Id.
8. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
9. Id. at 370.
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-50 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
11. Id.. at 320.
12. Id. at 313.
13. Id. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1988); Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990).
1
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B.

Economic Regulation

We have seen how Buckley equated taxation with robbery; similarly, Justice Janice Rogers Brown speaks of the deprivation of economic liberty in "A Whiter Shade of Pale." 15
In Up From Liberalism, Buckley states that he would prefer to live
under a regime that had economic liberty rather than without political
freedom rather than the reverse. 6 Justice Brown starts by equating
true "conservatives" with an endangered species or prisoners in a
gulag:
There are so few true conservatives left in America that we probably should be included on the endangered species list. That would
serve two purposes: Demonstrating the great compassion of our
government and relegating us to some remote wetlands habitat
where -

out of sight and out of mind -

we will cease being a

liberal body politic. In
dissonance in collectivist concerto of the 17
truth they need not banish us to the gulag.
Big government, centrally planned economics, the collectivist impulse
has led to slavery:
Writing 50 years ago, F.A. Hayek warned us that a centrally
planned economy is "The Road to Serfdom." He was right, of
course; but the intervening years have shown us that there are many
other roads to serfdom. In fact, it now appears that human nature is
so constituted that, as in the days of empire all roads led to Rome;
in the heyday of liberal democracy, all roads lead to slavery. And
we no longer find slavery abhorrent. We embrace it. We demand
more. Big government is not just the opiate of the masses. It is the
opiate. The drug of choice for multinational corporations and single
moms; for regulated industries
and rugged Midwestern farmers and
18
militant senior citizens.
Justice Brown describes American constitutionalism as being diverted into collectivism and away from the protection of property
rights:
Protection of property was a major casualty of the Revolution of
1937. The paradigmatic case, written by that premiere constitutional operative, William 0. Douglas, is Williamson v. Lee Optical.
The Court drew a line between personal rights and property rights
or economic interests, and applied two different constitutional tests.
Rights were reordered and property acquired a second class
status.19

15. Janice Rogers Brown, Assoc. Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, "A Whiter Shade of
Pale": Sense and Nonsense-The Pursuit of Perfection in Law and Politics, Address
Before the Federalist Society, University of Chicago Law School (April 20, 2000),
available at http://www.constitution.org/col/jrb/0O420-jrb-fedsoc.htm.
16. BUCKLEY, supra note 1, at 179.
17. Brown, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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The situation is comparable to that of an airplane captain blown out
of the cockpit, held only by his feet that were inside the plane:
We find ourselves, like the captain, in a situation that is hopeless but
not yet desperate. The arcs of history, culture, philosophy, and science all seem to be converging on this temporal instant. Familiar
arrangements are coming apart; valuable things are torn from our
hands, snatched away by the decompression of our fragile ark of
culture. But, it is too soon to despair. The collapse of the old system may be the crucible of a new vision. We must get a grip on
what we can and hold on. Hold on with all the energy and imagination and ferocity we possess. Hold on even while we accept the
darkness. We know not what miracles may happen; what heroic
possibilities exist. We may be only moments away from new
dawn.2 °
Justice Brown interpreted a case arising under California Proposition 209, the initiative that banned preferences in California.2 l Her
opinion invalidated a state program that encouraged participation by
minority business enterprise in a public works programs. Her opinion
starts with a recounting of Dread Scott and goes on to give a brief
history of law and race from the Civil War through Brown.22 Originally courts enforced laws against discrimination, but then a change
occurred and the law moved away from equal opportunity to entitlement: Our own decisional law has mirrored this change in focus from
protection of equal opportunity for all individuals to entitlement
based on group presentation.2 3
Brown equates this "prevailing social norm" of "proportional group
representation" with the "laws antedating, The Civil Rights Act, when
government could legally classify according to race."2 4 In Proposition
209, according to her, the voters intended to reinstitute the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act and equal protection that predated "...
such cases as Weber.' '25 Thus Proposition 209 goes back to the original teachings of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reversed the
slave-based decision of Dred Scott.
C.

The Second Amendment

The rhetoric of slavery is also found in the unlikely area of the Second Amendment, where those advocating an unrestricted individual
right to bear arms and those in favor of regulation each characterizes
their opponents' position as pro-slavery.
20. Id.
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
22. Hi Voltage Wire Works, Inv. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1073 (Cal. 2000)
(citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
23. Id. at 1079.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1103 (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) .32
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Professor David C. Williams argues that one of the amendment's
main purposes was to control slaves.2 6 The Southern States wanted to
maintain the militia for purposes of slave control.2 7 American law
based gun control on race: "White citizens, whatever their class or
religious status, had a right and usually a duty to be armed, but African-Americans enjoyed only a limited right to keep guns. The reasons
for this change are clear. As America was becoming a society deeply
divided by race, white Americans felt threatened by Native
Ameri28
cans on their borders and black slaves in their midst.
Professor Williams sees the Second Amendment "as an icon of the
imperial expansion of northern European culture. '29 "Americans, in
other words, came to love guns through hating Indians.
Later, these
30
same militias became instruments of slave control.
Supporters of reading the Second Amendment to guarantee an individual's right to bear arms also use slavery rhetoric to support their
cause. Professors Robert T. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond argue
that control of guns was a means of racial oppression.3 1 "To forestall
the possibility that free blacks would rebel either on their own or with
slaves, the southern states limited not only the right of slaves, but also
the right of free blacks, to bear arms. "32 After the Civil War, the
southern states passed the "black codes" in order to maintain control
over the former slaves, prohibiting "blacks from carrying firearms
without licenses. '33 In the twentieth century, many blacks used firearms to protect themselves from race riots and lynching,3 4 The authors
conclude from their history of white racism's disarming of blacks that
individuals should have a right to self-protection:
The history of blacks, firearms regulations, and the right to bear
arms should cause us to ask new questions regarding the Second
Amendment. These questions will pose problems both for advocates of stricter gun controls and for those who argue against them.
Much of the contemporary crime that concerns American is in poor
black neighborhoods and a case can be made that greater firearms
restrictions might alleviate this tragedy. But another, perhaps
stronger case can be made that a society with a dismal record of
protecting a people has a dubious claim on the right to disarm them.
Perhaps a re-examination of this history can lead us to a modern
realization of what the framers of the Second Amendment under26. David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and
the Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387 (1999).
27. Id. at 512.
28. Id. at 450.
29. Id. at 469.
30. Id.
31. Robert T. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward
an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991).
32. Id. at 336.
33. Id. at 344.
34. Id. at 349-59.
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stood: that it is unwise to place the means of protection totally in
the hands of the state, and that self-defense is also a civil right.35
D.

Anti-Abortion Speech

In yet another area, Professor Lynn D. Wardle likens anti-abortion
speech to that of abolitionists and the attempts to restrict that speech
to the effort to suppress abolitionist speech:
This article reviews some of the major consequences of Roe for
American law, our legal system, and also for our society. The primary focus is up on the growing threat to First Amendment values,
the dwindling free speech rights of anti-abortion protesters, and a
remarkably similar historical episode in which the free speech rights
of an unpopular, agitating, moralistic minority were seriously restricted by the federal government and many states... The thesis of
this Article is that we face another crisis in the current history of the
First Amendment like that presented by the efforts to suppress antislavery speech 150 years ago, and that officials who control our legal
institutions, especially our courts, need to take to heart the lessons
from the abolitionists' experience about the crucial importance of
protecting the rights of expression of unpopular political activists.3 6
Once again, we see the ubiquity and the power of the comparison.
Whatever one's position is, it comparable to those opposing slavery,
and one's adversaries are therefore essentially pro-slavery.
E.

Gay Marriage

Professor Katherine M. Franke uses the slavery argument to critique the battle for gay marriage. 37 Drawing a parallel to the experiences of liberated blacks, she describes the social controls put on
freed slaves. She argues that there is something wrong with marriage:
I want to interrogate a paradox lurking in virtually all modern civil
rights movements. The struggles of abject groups to emerge from
the obscurity of the legal margins into the mainstream of civil society often materialized through demands for legal recognition by the
state, and inclusion in the dominant legal and political institutions of
society. Marriage is a good example, but surely not the only one.
Ignored in these struggles is the degree to which these institutions
are highly regulatory in nature: They are the sites in which the state
is actively involved in creating social and legal statuses for both men
and women in highly raced and gendered terms. Thus, an institution like marriage accomplishes a kind of colonialism by domesticating more 'primitive" sexuality. Insofar as "sexuality . . . provides
the principle [sic] categories for a strategic transformation of behav35. Id. at 361.
36. Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson from the

Abolitionists, 62

ALB.

L. REV. 853, 855-56 (1999).

37. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of
African American Marriages, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. 251, 253 (1999).
734
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ior into manipulable [sic] "characterdogical" types," husbands and
wives-the primary adult units of civilized society-are the product
of this cultural positioning. 38
She recounts how "the robust enforcer of bigamy, fornication, and
adultery laws served to domesticate African-American people" and
make them conform "to the dictates of positive marriage laws." 39
Thus a rights-based strategy is problematic: "we should appreciate the
inherent complexities that lie in such strategies." 4 0
F.

What It's Not

Finally, we have an example of the non-application of slavery rhetoric to a legal problem. Justice Brown, dissenting in Stevenson v. Sup.
Ct.,4 (finding a common law cause of action for age discrimination),
argued that age was not equivalent to race: "discrimination based on
age is not, however, like race and sex discrimination." It does not
mark its victim with a "stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship;" it is the unavoidable consequence of that universal levelertime.4" Old people do not have a history of being purposefully discriminated against or being subject to stereotyping, it is not a status
one is locked into at birth.43 Thus age deserves no common law
protection.

II.

AN EVALUATION

As we have seen, the rhetorical characterization of one's opponents' position as being tantamount to slavery is ubiquitous, found in
fields as diverse as affirmative action and gun control. It crops up
everywhere-a recent example is Representative Sensenbrenner, who
equated employers hiring illegal aliens with nineteenth-century slave
masters.4 4 Even so, it is not an ordinary legal argument. It is not an
argument from authority; it relies on neither case law nor statute. It is
not the usual logic-based argument relying on such traditional legal
policies as "between two innocents he who caused the damage should
45
pay" or "no liability without fault.
It is a "social welfare argument," but it is one taken to such an extreme that is almost unrecognizable as such. Kennedy gives as an example of such an argument, "immunity will discourage the plaintiff's
38. Id. at 254.
39. Id. at 256-57.
40. Id. at 308.
41. Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1176 (Cal. 1997) (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
42. Id. at 1187.
43. Id. at 1188.
44. Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast May 28, 2006).
45. Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 75,
(1991).
735
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desirable activity." 46 Saying that the opposing view leads to slavery,
however, is saying that the behavior will destroy social welfare.
It is an extreme form of "flipping," the claiming that the central
idea of your opponent's argument actually leads to the opposite result
from the one she proposes."7 (E.g., Reverse unequal bargaining
power: interfering with freedom of contract will lead to pass-through
of the cost and impoverish the people you are trying to help.)
Thus affirmative action, far from helping blacks, will reinstate slavery, and taxation of the wealthy does not re-distribute income from
those most able to pay, but rather it robs them. Liberalism does not
further human freedom; instead it enchains the mind and makes slaves
of citizens.
It is an argument that has gone ballistic. By labeling the end product of the foe's position as slavery, it creates a picture of ruthless exploitation, based on killing and torture, a denial of humanity, a world
of horror. The opponent's position is not just mistaken, not just logically wrong, or based on a misreading of case or statutory law, but it is
part of an ideology of evil.
There are a few things wrong with this argument. One is that it is a
no-brainer: find some analogies or similarities between your opponent's position and slavery, embellish with a quote from Frederick
Douglass, and you're off to the races.
It is also an exaggeration. Let's say that given an admission system
based on LSATs, a law school would admit ninety whites and ten minorities. With "affirmative action," it will be ninety whites and ten
minorities. There may be policy, legal, and constitutional problems
with the "affirmative action plan," but it is hardly recreating the socioeconomic system of the Antebellum South.
Lastly, and most importantly, it does not advance the ball in terms
of understanding, negotiation, and compromise, the functions of free
debate and argument. One side is righteous and the other evil. This
rhetorical choice has been effective but works only to divide society.
46. Id. at 79.
47. Id. at 87.
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